Submitted by wcsadmin on Mon, 05/14/2012 - 13:59
I have been, I think, fairly even-handed in my treatment of the Chase incident in my last two posts. There is, however, one nagging question that sticks in my mind and has since the very beginning: Was this a legitimate hedge or a directional play masquerading as a hedge? The sheer size of the loss argues for a directional play that amounted to either a Texas hedge(doubling down) or some kind of attempt either to martingale the original trade or to spread a loss.
Submitted by wcsadmin on Sat, 05/12/2012 - 10:47
In my last post, I did not address the question of what the best safeguards against future problems might be. I have heard everything from calling for a reinstatement of Glass-Steagal to breaking up the banks that are too big to fail to the Volker rule, which would forbid banks from investing insured deposits into risky leveraged instruments like derivatives and their ilk, to increasing the reserve requirements as a bank gets larger. Before we get too far into this, keep in mind that Chase, in using a hedge to insure themselves against systemic risks in the EU, was trying to do exactly what any of their customers, and the rest of us who depend on a stable banking system should want them to do: mitigate the risk to shareholders and customers by protecting their assets. That is the purpose of a hedge.
Submitted by wcsadmin on Fri, 05/11/2012 - 21:57
Well, the JP Morgan Chase mess is all over the news, and the usual suspects are all singing their respective, and predictable, choruses. The left is screaming for regulation/revenge. The right is saying to wait for the facts, free market, free market, free market. Neither of these is all that useful. As a trader, here is my take on the thing.
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